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Why
Most calculi/languages for GC rely on code mobility to model
interprocesses interactions;
This leads to security concerns (malicious agents can
compromise ‘good’ sites through viruses, spammings,
denial-of-service attacks, ...);
Thus, code mobility usually equipped with security checks:
1 static checks: make the run-time as efﬁcient as possible, but
it may be not adequate in practice;
2 dynamic checks: make the runtime heavier, execution
slower, but are ﬂexible.
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Simple
Systems are (plain) collections of sites;
Sites are places for computations, divided in at least two layers:
a computing body
a membrane, to carry on security related issues
membranes regulate the interactions between the computing
body and the environment around the site
differently from Boudol’s and Stefani’s: our membranes are not
fully-ﬂedged computing entities. They only implement
higher-level (type related) veriﬁcation on incoming agents.
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The Objectives
Run an initial investigation into what kind of security policies can be
implemented through membranes, and how.
This is related to, and aims at generalizing for the speciﬁc application
the security types developed for Dπ and KLAIM;
the session types by Honda et al;
the generic types by Igarashi, Kobayashi.
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What
1 a formal framework to formalize processes running in a GC
system, whose activities are local computations and migrations;
2 membranes to implement advanced checks on incoming
agents (including notions of trust and proof-carrying code);
3 tools to enforce different kind of policies.
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A Calculus for Migrations
A minimal calculus (Turing not an issue here)
BasicActions a,b,c,... ∈ Act
Localities l,h,k,... ∈ Loc
Agents P,Q,R ::= nil

 a.P

 goTl.P

 P | Q

 !P
Systems N ::= 0

 l[[ M |i P ]]

 N1 k N2
where
l[[ M |i P ]] is a site with address l, membrane M and hosting
process P;
goTl.P is an agent willing to migrate on l, whose body is P and
exhibiting as PCC the policy T.
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Dynamic Semantics – local
Local behaviours:
l[[ M |i a.P|Q ]] − → l[[ M |i P|Q ]]
Remark: we are not really interested in the local computations.
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Dynamic Semantics – migration
Migration:
k[[ M |i goTl.P|Q ]] k l[[ M0 |i R ]] − → k[[ M |i Q ]] k l[[ M0 |i P|R ]]
This reduction may happen only if P complies with M0.
But checking whole processes at migration can be very expensive!
Solution: PCCs. A source-generated and certiﬁed ‘process outline’
accepted as such at destination.
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The matter with certiﬁcation
When can we consider PCCs?
They are easy to verify (they are usually very small, if compared
to the process they refer to), but
they can be dangerous (if they don’t certify properly the
process behaviour)
A compromise:
we can safely consider PCCs of agents coming from trusted
sites, i.e. sites that calculate the PCC attached to a
migrating agent “properly.”
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Trust
Each site store the trust it has on other sites, as part of its membrane.
Thus, a membrane is a couple (Mt,Mp), where
Mt : Loc → {good,bad,unknown};
Mp is an upper bound to the local actions of incoming agents.
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The Migration Rule – revised
k[[ M |i goTl.P|Q ]] k l[[ M0 |i R ]]
− → k[[ M |i Q ]] k l[[ M0 |i P|R ]] if M0 `k
T P
where M0 `k
T P is
if M0
t(k) = good then (T enforces M0
p ) else ` P : M0
p
and
predicate enforces is a partial order on policies;
` is a compliance check of a process against a policy.
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Policies as Constraints on Legal Actions
a site only provides some methods (i.e. only some actions can
be executed while running in it)
a policy T is a subset of Act ∪ Loc where
a process can only execute locally actions in T
a process can only migrate on sites in T
T enforces T0 is simply deﬁned as T ⊆ T0;
judgment ` is simple. The key rules are
` P : T
` a.P : T
a ∈ T
` P : T0
` goT0l.P : T
l ∈ T
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Policies as Constraints on Legal Actions (ctd)
a system N is well-formed, written ` N : ok, if “good” nodes only
hosts “good” agents. Formally:
` P : Mp
` l[[ M |i P ]] : ok
l good
` l[[ M |i P ]] : ok
l not good
Subject Reduction: If ` N : ok and N − → N0, then ` N0 : ok.
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Counting Legal Actions
sometimes, legal actions can be performed only a certain
number of times. E.g.:
a fair mail server allows its clients to send mails, but:
it should block spamming activities of malicious clients; thus:
it could allow sending at most K mails for each login of each client.
Policies are multisets containing elements from Act ∪ Loc ;
T enforces T0 is multisets inclusion;
` adapts straightforwardly from the case of sets:
` P : T
` a.P : T ∪ {a}
` P : T0
` goT0l.P : T ∪ {l}
` P : T1 ` Q : T2
` P | Q : T1 ∪ T2
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Counting Legal Actions (ctd)
This setting enforces a thread-wise property. Indeed,
if two different agents P and Q individually send at most K mails,
when they both run in the mail server, the agent P | Q can send
more than K mails (actually, it can send 2K mails)
Thus, the well-formedness predicate for good sites is changed as
∀i . (Pi a thread and ` Pi : Mp)
` l[[ M |i P1|...|Pn ]] : ok
l good
Subject reduction holds for this modiﬁed judgment
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Sequencing Legal Actions
sometimes, legal actions can be performed only in a certain
order. E.g.
before exploiting the functionalities of a mail server, you must have
logged in, and
before loggin out, you must have saved the status of the
transaction.
This can be easily formalized by (deterministic) ﬁnite automata
usr.pwd.(list + send + retr + del + reset)∗.quit
Policies are DFAs;
T enforces T0 is inclusion of DFAs’s languages;
` P : T holds if the language of P is accepted by T.
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Sequencing Legal Actions (ctd)
As well-known, inclusion of regular languages can be
calculated easily, once given the associated DFAs
What about predicate ` P : T?
we expect that calculating it is harder than verifying PCCs
(i.e. verifying predicate enforces)
But, how harder? Is it decidable?
what is the language associated to an agent?
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Sequencing Legal Actions (ctd2)
an agent can be easily associated to a concurrent regular
expression: regular exprs with shufﬂe ⊗ and shufﬂe closure .
e.g., agent !(a.b | c.goTl.P) can be represented as
((a · b) ⊗ (c · l))
we are only interested in the local behaviour of the agent.
we can derive the language associated to this CRE and check
whether it is contained in the language accepted by the policy;
CREs can be represented as Petri nets. Inclusion of a Petri net in
a DFA is decidable, even if super-exponential;
This is done by static analysis algorithm, not by a type system!
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Controlling Coalitions at a Site
policies as multisets and as DFAs can only express
thread-oriented properties;
Dealing with the overall behaviour of a site; Two options: When
agent P want to migrate on l, containing agent R
1 freeze and retrieve the current content of the site, viz. R;
check whether P | R respects the policy of the site;
reactivate R and, according to the result of the checking
phase, activate P.
2 let membranes evolving at run-time: they are decreased
with the privileges granted to P.
I’m sure you see that the ﬁrst option is just crazy...
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Controlling Coalitions at a Site (ctd)
A new migration rule:
k[[ M |i goTl.P|Q ]] k l[[ M0 |i R ]]
− → k[[ M |i Q ]] k l[[ M00 |i P|R ]] if M0 `k
T P  M00
where M0 `k
T P  M00:
veriﬁes whether P respects M0
p (by examining its PCC T or its
code, according to the trust level in its origin, k);
if P respects M0
p, it decrease M0
p with the privileges granted to P.
This returns M00
p
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Controlling Coalitions at a Site (ctd2)
Well-formed systems are now deﬁned w.r.t. a function Θ associating
each good site to a initial policy.
Θ ` l[[ M |i P ]] : ok
l good
(pol(P) t Mp) enforces Θ(l)
where
pol(P) returns the minimal policy satisﬁed by P;
t merges together two policies.
Subject Reduction: If Θ ` N : ok and N − → N0, then Θ ` N0 : ok.
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Conclusions
a formal framework to reason on the role of membranes as
security policies
several variations expressing ﬁner and ﬁner policies
to be done:
a richer calculus (including communications, restrictions, ...)
more complex policies (not expressible with DFAs)
...
the paper is available at
www.dsi.uniroma1.it/~gorla/papers/GHS-membranes.ps
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